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Is There a Fatherhood Wage Premium?
A Reassessment in Societies With Strong
Male-Breadwinner Legacies
Objective: This study examines whether father-
hood sparks the wage attainment of men or
rather entry into fatherhood is simply more typ-
ical for high-earning men and at times of wage
growth during the career cycle.
Background: Fatherhood premiums may con-
tribute to gender economic inequalities, particu-
larly in countries with strong male-breadwinner
legacies such as Germany and the United King-
dom. Yet, as male-breadwinner norms have
waned and policies have started fostering men’s
role as carers, wage premiums could be a thing
of the past. Also, themechanisms usually invoked
to account for fatherhood premiums—effort
allocation, couple specialization, and employer
discrimination—seem of little relevance even in
these countries. Entry into parenthood spurred
by wage attainment is therefore scrutinized as
an alternative source of the apparent premiums
on average and across cohorts.
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Method: The author uses long-running
panel data for both countries and three
regression-based approaches (pooled ordi-
nary least squares, fixed effects estimation, and
fixed effects individual-slope estimation).
Results: Overall, fatherhood wage bonuses
could not be detected on average as well as
across birth cohorts. At best, estimates were
compatible with modest premiums among older
cohorts of men. Positive selection on both prior
wage levels and wage growth was found to be
largely responsible for the apparent wage boost.
The contribution of selection on prior wage
levels though has been fading across cohorts,
meaning that men select into fatherhood less
and less on the basis of time-invariant charac-
teristics positively related to both wages and the
chance of becoming a father.
Conclusion: The link between fatherhood and
wages appears to be more of a selection story
than a causal one, even in contexts with strong
male-breadwinner legacies.
Motherhood wage penalties are now key drivers
of gender wage gaps in high-income coun-
tries (for a review, see Ponthieux & Meurs,
2015). Counterpart to wage losses for mothers,
fathers may receive more modest wage pre-
miums (Killewald, 2013; Lundberg & Rose,
2000; Petersen, Penner, & Høgsnes, 2011). Yet,
although the question of whether motherhood
causally affects wages has come under intense
scrutiny (e.g., Elwert & Winship, 2014), few
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have asked the same about fatherhood (for an
exception, see Loughran & Zissimopoulos,
2009).
I first reconsider the possibility that fathers
earn more due to howmen select into fatherhood
(e.g., Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008; Trimarchi &
Van Bavel, 2017). Previous research has care-
fully accounted for the fact that high-earning
men are more likely to become fathers. Selec-
tion, though, may also operate through the supe-
rior wage growth of fathers-to-be rather than just
through their wage levels (Ludwig & Brüderl,
2018). Accounting for both, this study provides
a more severe test for the causal effect of father-
hood on wages.
Second, adding to a literature mainly based
on the United States, I compare here Germany
and the United Kingdom. These two countries
have long supported male breadwinning both
through policy and culturally. The inability to
support a causal story for fatherhood and wages
would thus be particularly meaningful in such
contexts. As male-breadwinner norms have
waned (Knight & Brinton, 2017) and policies
in both countries have extended family-leave
rights to men (Blum, Koslowski, Macht, &
Moss, 2018), rich longitudinal data also allows
investigating heterogeneity across cohorts. This
has been overlooked in previous studies, perhaps
partly because of the invariance of the policy
context of fatherhood in the United States (at
least at the federal level, cf. Baum & Ruhm,
2016).
If present in the past, wage premiums
may have declined and particularly in Ger-
many. Comprehensive evidence has pointed
to a (small) shift in effort from the market
to the household for recent cohorts of Ger-
man men (Leopold, Skopek, & Schulz, 2018;
Pollmann-Schult & Reynolds, 2017; Tamm,
2018). Notably, German fathers have increas-
ingly accessed a generous and relatively long
parental leave provision put in place since 2007
(e.g., Bünning, 2015). In the United Kingdom,
evidence points to similar changes in men’s
contribution to household production (e.g.,
Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Huerta et al., 2014),
but policy change regarding fathers has been
less extensive (Lewis, 2002; Lewis & Camp-
bell, 2007; Tanaka & Waldfogel, 2007). This
further motivates a cross-country, cross-cohort
comparative perspective. If fatherhood wage
premiums prove persisting, they may further
deepen gender wage gaps or make it such that,
even if the mommy penalty will narrow down,
gender wage gaps will endure (Petersen, Penner,
& Høgsnes, 2014).
Considering whether fatherhood to this day
causally affects men’s wages is thus paramount
to disentangle the sources of gender economic
inequality. In short, I ask here (a) if fatherhood
premiums are causal or rather a by-product of
the process by which men select into fatherhood;
(b) whether premiums are found in contexts with
strong, yet fading, male-breadwinner legacies;
and (c) whether premiums for fathers have faded
too or have rather persisted across cohorts.
Background
Why There Could Be a Fatherhood Premium:
Reviewing Previous Evidence and Mechanisms
Considering previous evidence, the fatherhood
wage premium seems generally modest in size
and is not always detected across contexts. Both
findings are in stark contrast with research on
motherhood wage penalties. Estimates of the
gross premium for all fathers have been the
largest in North America, up to a range of 6%
to 13% in Canada and the United States (Cooke
& Fuller, 2018; Hodges & Budig, 2010; Lund-
berg & Rose, 2000). In Norway and Denmark,
premiums have not been ascertained (Cools,
Markussen, & Strøm, 2017; Kleven, Landais,
& Sogaard, 2018) or have at best amounted to
1% to 2% (Petersen et al., 2011). Few studies
have examined the premium in Germany and
the United Kingdom, finding for the former a
2% to 3% wage boost for higher order pari-
ties (Pollmann-Schult, 2011). For a comparison,
gross motherhood wage losses have typically
been estimated in excess of 15% in Germany
(Beblo, Bender, & Wolf, 2008; Gangl & Ziefle,
2009; Kühhirt & Ludwig, 2012) and of around
12% in the United Kingdom (Gangl & Ziefle,
2009; see also Harkness, 2016). Beyond Ger-
many and the United Kingdom, substantial eco-
nomic losses for mothers seem rather universal
across contexts (e.g., Kleven, Landais, Posch,
Steinhauer, & Zweimüller, 2019).
When detected, wage premiums for fathers
have been traced back to individual changes in
work effort, couple specialization, and employer
discrimination. Based on previous evidence and
theoretical considerations, though, the explana-
tory power of each of these mechanisms can
be called into question. For one, fatherhood
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may elicit an increase in men’s work effort
(e.g., Eggebeen & Knoester, 2001). Yet studies
based on household data have not been able to
assess this due to the lack of precise measures of
productivity, relying instead on proxies of effort
or productivity such as working hours. As pre-
viously acknowledged (Killewald, 2013), work-
ing hours may be poor proxies of effort or only
affect wages in the long run, as hard-working
employees signal themselves to employers and
secure thereby better-paid positions in internal
labor markets (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999). In
the short run, working longer hours may increase
total earnings rather than wage rates, but studies
of the fatherhood premium have typically been
concerned with the latter (for an exception, see
Cooke, 2014).
Furthermore, fatherhood may propel a man
to increase his work effort only conditional on
whether his earning potential exceeds that of
his partner (Becker, 1981). Fatherhood wage
premiums should thus be observed particularly
for those men whose partner reduces working
hours or leaves paid work come parenthood.
Indeed, U.S.-based studies have found that mar-
ried fathers, and among them especially those
whose wives interrupt employment or cut back
work hours, add extra working hours of their
own and gain a wage premium (Killewald, 2013;
Killewald & Gough, 2013; Lundberg & Rose,
2000).
Assessing the impact of couple-level spe-
cialization on the wages of fathers, however,
presents additional complications due to the “en-
dogeneity of family” (Lundberg, 2005, p. 603).
Couple formation is often a transitory event,
considering that splitting and repartnering are
commonplace (Elzinga & Liefbroer, 2007). If
specialization affects couple formation and sta-
bility, conditioning the analyses of fatherhood
premiums on the presence and characteristics
of a partner may induce selection bias (Elwert
& Winship, 2014). For example, if couples in
which women do not specialize in household
production aremore likely to split (e.g., Kalmijn,
Loeve, & Manting, 2007; Lepinteur, Fleche, &
Powdthavee, 2016; for a review, see Cooke &
Baxter, 2010), surviving couples at any given
point in time may be the ones more likely to
(have) specialize(d). The role of couple special-
ization on the wages of fathers may thus be exag-
gerated, yet studies have neglected this point so
far (e.g., Killewald & Gough, 2013).
Moving on from the behaviors of fathers and
couples, wage premiums for fathers may also
result from employer discrimination. Employ-
ers may prefer fathers, expecting them to be
more productive, competent, or committed than
their childless counterparts (cf. Correll, Benard,
& Paik, 2007; Phelps, 1972). Even regardless
of factual productivity differences between male
employees, men could be differentially treated
in the workplace depending on parental sta-
tus. In a lab experiment with U.S. undergradu-
ate students, Correll et al. (2007) indeed found
that fathers were evaluated as more committed,
would have been hired more often, and would
have been offered higher starting salaries than
childless men, holding job applicants’ features
equal. Yet, in the companion field experiment,
differences in call-back rates between equiva-
lent fathers and childless men were not detected.
The same inconclusive evidence has recently
emerged from a large field experiment across
multiple job titles in Sweden (Bygren, Erlands-
son, & Gähler, 2017).
Hence, a review of the size and generative
mechanisms of the fatherhood bonus motivates
asking whether expecting a causal effect of
fatherhood on wages is warranted in the first
place.
Contextual Underpinnings of the Wage
Trajectories of Fathers in Germany and the
United Kingdom
Although addressing wage determination at
the individual level, contextual factors that
may shape the fatherhood premium (and its
drivers) have been overlooked in the literature
(cf. Cooke, 2014). One might expect that a
strong male-breadwinner norm, both culturally
and institutionally enforced, may foster shifts in
market effort after the transition to fatherhood, a
traditional specialization pattern within couples,
or employer bias in favor of fathers.
Looking at the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, I compare two countries with strong
yet drifting male-breadwinner legacies (e.g.,
Crompton, 1999). Culturally, male-breadwinner
norms have been stronger in former West Ger-
many rather than in the United Kingdom (Knight
& Brinton, 2017; Trappe, Pollmann-Schult, &
Schmitt, 2015). Unfavorable attitudes toward
mothers’ employment—whether full-time or in
general during a child’s preschool years—persist
in both countries (Dechant & Rinklake, 2016;
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O’Reilly, Nazio, & Roche, 2014). Still, atti-
tudes in both countries have shifted away from
traditionalist views that assigned to men the role
of (sole) breadwinners and to women the role
of full-time carers and homemakers (Knight &
Brinton, 2017).
As for policy, fatherhood has long been
synonymous with providing. This has been
emphasized, for one, via mandated cash trans-
fers from fathers to mothers in case of couple
dissolution (Hobson, 2002). Lately, however,
and to a somewhat greater extent in Germany,
policy reform started targeting fathers for
care obligations rather than for cash provision
(Adler & Lenz, 2017). In 2007, Germany intro-
duced two bonus months of paid parental leave
granted to households in which both parents
take some portion of the leave period. As a
result, father involvement in the household
appears to have increased (e.g., Tamm, 2018)
in times of a broader, if slow, gender conver-
gence in the division of labor (Leopold et al.,
2018; Pollmann-Schult & Reynolds, 2017).
The United Kingdom, differently, opted for a
paid statutory paternity leave (2003), with high
uptake rates but lasting only 2weeks, and a
parental leave scheme (2015) only partly paid
and so far largely not exploited by new parents
(Blum et al., 2018).
Changes in the cultural and policy contexts
surrounding fatherhood thus further enrich the
chance to understand the contextual underpin-
nings of fatherhood premiums (if any) over time
in the two countries. First, fatherhood may act as
a transforming event and spur men’s work effort
particularly in contexts where male breadwin-
ning is culturally reinforced (Townsend, 2002).
Yet the transition to fatherhood does little to
change men’s attitudes toward work and fam-
ily, as men seem not to become more (or less)
traditional after the birth of a child (Grinza,
Devicienti, Rossi, & Vannoni, 2017; Kuziemko,
Pan, Shen, & Washington, 2018). Coherently,
findings regarding fathers’ working hours as
a proxy for effort suggest that, even in for-
mer male-breadwinner regimes, men do not
commit more fully to breadwinning after the
birth of a child. Indeed, average working hours
actually decline after the transition to father-
hood in most European countries (Bünning &
Pollmann-Schult, 2016). In Germany, becoming
a father prompts an increase in working hours
for men born prior to 1960, but a decrease in
working hours for men belonging to younger
cohorts, and both changes are modest in size
(1 hour of paid work at most; Pollmann-Schult
& Reynolds, 2017). For Britain, previous studies
provide little evidence that the presence of chil-
dren affects men’s working hours at all (Bryan,
2007; Paull, 2008; Schober, 2013).
Men could still increase their work effort
conditional on their partner’s investment in the
household, consistent with a traditional mode of
couple specialization. Tax policies, for example,
may provide incentives for particular household
arrangements regarding paid and unpaid work.
Pooling the income of both partners to determine
personal income tax, Germany discourages paid
employment among secondary earners (Bick &
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2017; Smith, Dex, Vlasblom,
& Callan, 2003), and may thereby foster tradi-
tional couple specialization. Differently, Britain
switched from joint to individual taxation in
1990, further pursuing tax credit policies since
the end of the 1990s with the aim of encourag-
ing maternal labor supply (Francesconi, Rainer,
& Van Der Klaauw, 2009; Francesconi & Van
der Klaauw, 2007). Perhaps surprisingly, though,
couple specialization in both the United King-
dom and Germany deviates somewhat from the
Beckerian model when it comes to the transition
to parenthood. Mothers indeed trade off employ-
ment hours with time spent in housework and
child care, yet fathers’ allocation of time to either
paid or unpaid work is hardly affected by parent-
hood regardless of their partner’s behavior (e.g.,
Kühhirt, 2012; Schober, 2013).
Employer bias in favor of fathers may still
rest on the assumption, however justified, that
men will maintain or even increase their com-
mitment to paid work after the birth of a child.
In recent years, such an assumption may also
have eroded because of fathers’ use of pater-
nity and parental leaves, which may signal a
parallel and potentially conflicting commitment
to the family sphere. In Britain, around 80%
of fathers now take time off around the birth
of a child, although mostly in the form of
the 2-week paternity leave introduced in 2003
(Blum et al., 2018). In Germany, fathers have
been entitled to paid parental leave provisions
since the end of the 1980s, but fathers’ uptake
became substantial only after the aforemen-
tioned 2007 reform. According to the latest
figures, more than 30% of German fathers now
use parental leave provisions, typically using up
the 2-month bonus (Bünning, 2015; Kluve &
Tamm, 2013). Notably, these figures for German
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fathers approach those of their counterparts in
Sweden. Swedish fathers taking parental leave
have been found to experience modest wage
penalties after returning to work, a finding schol-
ars have interpreted as evidence of adverse sig-
naling (Albrecht, Thoursie, & Vroman, 2015;
Evertsson, Grunow, & Aisenbrey, 2016). Also,
wage penalties for fathers taking leave may stem
from a reorientation of effort from the market to
the household (Rege & Solli, 2013). It is at best
unclear, therefore, if employers may still assume
increased commitment to work among fathers
and discriminate in their favor, particularly in
modern-day Germany.
Broadly, as male-breadwinner norms waned
and policies have shifted their emphasis from
cash to care, it could be that fatherhood premi-
ums are at best a thing of the past in both coun-
tries, and possibly even more in Germany than
in the United Kingdom. In addition to the aver-
age causal effect of fatherhood on wages, I will
thus look into its possible heterogeneity across
cohorts.
Why There Might Not Be a Fatherhood
Premium After All: The Role of Selection
Support for the idea of a fatherhood wage pre-
mium is thus mixed, even when considering con-
texts with strongmale-breadwinner legacies. It is
natural to ask, then, whether the fatherhood pre-
mium is causal or rather driven by selection into
fatherhood. I consider here two sources of selec-
tion: selection on prior wage levels and selection
on prior wage growth.
Similar to selection into marriage (for a
review, see Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018), selection
on prior wage levels entails that high-earning
men are, by the same token, more likely to
become fathers. As Cooke and Fuller (2018,
p. 783) put it, “positive selection might account
for the gross (wage) premium if the men who
become fathers have unmeasured characteristics
such as loyalty and commitment valued simi-
larly by employers and potential partners.” If
such positive selection holds, ignoring it would
lead to an overestimation of fatherhood wage
premiums.
Research on what kind of men eventually
become fathers is relatively underdeveloped
(Balbo, Billari, & Mills, 2013; Kreyenfeld &
Konietzka, 2017). Across countries, highly
educated men have better chances of becoming
a father than do low-educated men, yet much
appears to be due to selection into union (e.g.,
Trimarchi & Van Bavel, 2017). If fatherhood
and union formation are a compound, one might
expect selection into fatherhood to overlap with
selection into marriage, and both of them will
be positive (for a review, see Ludwig & Brüderl,
2018). As long as drivers of positive selection
are unobserved, cross-sectional estimates of the
bonus (e.g., Cooke, 2014; Cooke & Fuller, 2018;
Petersen et al., 2011, 2014) might thus suffer
from selection bias due to omitted variables
in the regression equation. Relying on panel
data, differently, one can add individual fixed
effects (FE) to curb estimates from selection
on such time-invariant unobservables. Com-
paring the latter to cross-sectional estimates
has highlighted negative selection may be at
play, as panel estimates of the daddy bonus
are typically bigger than their cross-sectional
counterparts (Hodges & Budig, 2010; Lundberg
& Rose, 2000). Yet, once again, these studies
have only focused on the United States. They
could thus speak to the specificity of the Ameri-
can context where fatherhood—or at least early
fatherhood—may go hand in hand with markers
of earning and life-course disadvantage such
as dropping out of high school or incarceration
(e.g., Dariotis, Pleck, Astone, & Sonenstein,
2011). Hence, also the direction of selection on
prior wage levels is at best ambiguous, much
like the effectiveness of mechanisms purport-
edly leading to a causal bonus discussed in the
previous sections.
Yet selection could also operate through a
different path. Men may select into fatherhood,
depending on their wage growth rather than sim-
ply on their wage levels (Ludwig & Brüderl,
2018). The transition to parenthood, much like
that to marriage (Killewald & Lundberg, 2017),
may simply occur at times of fast wage growth
in the career cycle. For one, as men who become
fathers are disproportionately better educated
(Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008; Trimarchi & Van
Bavel, 2017), they do not simply enjoy high
wages but also steep wage growth paths (e.g.,
Lagakos, Moll, Porzio, Qian, & Schoellman,
2018)—steeper, possibly, than that of relatively
less-educatedmenwho aremore likely to remain
childless. This might hold especially for men
belonging to younger cohorts, as they typi-
cally have children later in life after consider-
able accumulation of experience and wages in
the market (McMunn et al., 2015; Struffolino,
Studer, & Fasang, 2016). Once again, the United
6 Journal of Marriage and Family
States might not provide the best context to
assess this selection dynamic, asmean age at first
birth has not increased much across cohorts, and
the transition to parenthood is still prominent
in men’s early 20s when labor market careers
are not yet consolidated (e.g., Mills, Rindfuss,
McDonald, Te Velde, & the ESHRE Reproduc-
tion and Society Task Force, 2011).
Previous comparative studies for European
countries, including the United Kingdom and
Germany, have indeed found that the wages of
men grow already in the period prior to father-
hood (Smith Koslowski, 2011). Yet such liter-
ature has not drawn one important implication
out of this finding. If the wage spikes prior to
fatherhood are comparable to the wage spikes
observed after fatherhood, then speaking of a
bonus sparked by fatherhood is unwarranted
given the observed data pattern (e.g., Killewald
& Lundberg, 2017; Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018).
The tests I devise in this study, therefore, will
try to detect a spike in wages occurring in the
aftermath of fatherhood, once one accounts for
men’s selection into fatherhood based on both
wage levels and on wage growth.
Methods
Data and Samples
I employ long-running household panel data,
namely, the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP v31; Goebel et al., 2018) and the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS;
University of Essex, Institute for Social and
Economic Research, 2018). Both are multi-
purpose household surveys following the lives
of a representative sample of each country’s
residents (Buck & McFall, 2011; Goebel et al.,
2018; Taylor, Brice, Buck, & Prentice-Lane,
2010). Both datasets also comprise fertility his-
tory files (respectively, Goebel, 2017; Pronzato,
2011) that I used to recover information on the
transition to fatherhood.
For the United Kingdom, I rely on all BHPS
sample members. The BHPS was temporarily
discontinued in 2009, but its sample started
being interviewed again in 2010 to 2011 within
the framework of the U.K. Household Longitu-
dinal Study (UKHLS). My analyses thus rely on
the full data available for the BHPS sample, cov-
ering, despite the gap, the period from 1991 to
2016. For Germany, I employ samples A to H
as well as refreshment samples J and K, cover-
ing the period 1984–2014. In the main analyses,
I focus on men aged 20 to 50, working as depen-
dent employees, with nonmissing information
on their fertility history as well as on their cur-
rent wage. Furthermore, given my focus on the
transition to fatherhood, I restrict my analyses to
men who, when first observed in the panel, had
no children. During the observation period, part
of this initial pool will experience the transition
to fatherhood (treated group), whereas the rest
will remain childless (control group). For some
of the men in this latter group, family histories
may be truncated: They might become fathers
after the last data point in each panel or drop out
of the panels prior to their transition to father-
hood. If arguments on selection hold, this sub-
group of men among the controls might actually
be more similar to fathers(-to-be) than childless
men, and this would in turn attenuate estimates
of the fatherhood premium. Hence, to ensure that
the control group does not include prospective
fathers who might be on a similar wage trajec-
tory to that of the treated, I further limit my anal-
yses to men who have been observed at least
until age 40, thereby selecting cohorts of men
born not after 1974 for Germany and not after
1976 for the United Kingdom. The cut-off point
at age 40 is assumed to be indicative of com-
pleted fertility for men, as less than 10% of the
transitions to fatherhood occurred past age 40
in the final samples for both countries (see also
Kleven et al., 2018). Applying or not this sam-
ple restriction, however, does not alter the sub-
stantial conclusions of this article (for sensitiv-
ity checks and a discussion, see Section 8 of
Appendix S1).
Finally, due the requirements of one of the sta-
tistical models I will use (FE individual-slope
[FEIS] model, see below), I further limit my
analyses to men who have been observed for at
least three waves in the panel (Brüderl & Lud-
wig, 2015; Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018). Together,
these restrictions result in a sample of 2,713
men (1,013 of which will become first-time
fathers) and 34,925 person-year records for Ger-
many, and a sample of 1,253 men (572 of
which will become first-time fathers) and 15,470
person-year records for the United Kingdom. In
both samples, men are followed for an average
of roughly 12 waves. After (prior) the birth of
a child, in particular, first-time fathers are fol-
lowed for an average of roughly 12 (five) waves
in the German sample and 10 (five) waves in the
British sample.
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Table 1. Summary of Sample Restrictions and Relative Sample Sizes
SOEP BHPS-UKHLS
N person-years (N individuals) % N person-years (N individuals) %
All men aged 20 to 50 146,334 (20,109) 100 74,462 (10,883) 100
In dependent employment 106,054 72.5 53,550 71.9
(16,452) (81.8) (8,544) (78.5)
Complete fertility history 88,088 60.2 52,917 71.1
(11,879) (59.1) (8,227) (75.6)
First-time fathers and childless men 58,625 40.1 33,902 45.5
(7,591) (37.7) (5,395) (49.6)
Observed at least until age 40 37,076 25.3 17,437 23.4
(3,236) (16.1) (1,649) (15.1)
Nonmissing on current wage 35,923 24.5 16,086 21.6
(3,160) (15.7) (1,539) (14.1)
Observed for at least three waves 35,344 24.1 15,743 21.1
(2,747) (13.6) (1,285) (11.8)
No child when first observed 34,925 23.8 15,470 20.8
(2,713) (13.5) (1,253) (11.5)
Note: BHPS = British Household Panel Survey; SOEP = German Socio-Economic Panel; UKHLS = U.K. Household
Longitudinal Study.
Table 1 sums up all sample restrictions and
relative sample sizes. Notably, restricting the
sample to individuals observed for at least
three waves has a minor impact on the final
sample counts. My main findings, coherently,
are unaltered by this choice (see Figure 1 in
Appendix S1).
With the exception of the selection of suitable
treatment and control groups, the most substan-
tial drop in sample size is observed because of
the use of fertility history files for the SOEP. For
Germany, the SOEP started collecting men’s fer-
tility histories only from 2000 onward (Goebel,
2017). Respondents that dropped from the panel
prior to that date are not included in the anal-
yses. Nevertheless, replicating the analyses for
Germany using fertility info from the core file
(i.e., number of children in the household) does
not alter any of the conclusions on the impact
of fatherhood on wages for German men (see
Section 6 in Appendix S1).
Measures
The outcome variable in this study is the log of
real hourly wages. Hourly wages are computed
by dividing gross monthly pay by the amount
of weekly working hours multiplied by 4.35,
the approximate number of weeks in a month.
For BHPS, I sum weekly working hours and
hours of overtime (Bryan & Sevilla-Sanz, 2011).
For SOEP, I use actual working hours or, when
missing, the sum of contractual working hours
and of overtime (Kühhirt & Ludwig, 2012).
As per Table 1, listwise deletion on missing
wages only lead to marginal sample losses of
0.8% and 1.8% of the potential sample in the
SOEP and BHPS, respectively.
Wages are then indexed at 2014 prices (2016
for the United Kingdom) and values below 1
or above 100 are trimmed, following standard
practices in the literature (e.g., Kühhirt & Lud-
wig, 2012). Taking the natural logarithm of real
wages then enables the interpretation of coef-
ficients in terms of percentage effects on wage
levels, as the log scale well approximates the
percentage-point scale as long as coefficients lie
in the [−0.25, 0.25] interval.
I deploy twomeasures to single out the effects
of the transition to fatherhood. The first is a sim-
ple dummy (Childit) that equals 0 prior to the
birth of the first child and 1 in its aftermath. In a
second model specification, I consider the effect
of the transition to fatherhood as distributed
along the life course of men (e.g., Dougherty,
2006). Instead of a single dummy switching
from 0 to 1 after the transition to fatherhood, I
operationalize fatherhood via a series of dum-
mies k for each year t since the first child’s birth.
Whenever relevant data were available (thus,
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with the exclusion of the UKHLS arm), both
measures are corrected for the month in which
the child is born. If the child’s birth occurred in
the interview year, but months prior to the inter-
view, the relevant dummy is set to 0. Only if the
interview occurred in the same month of birth or
after, the relevant dummy is set to 1.
Focusing on the transition to fatherhood, and
thus on the first parity, is consistent with part of
the literature on family events and wages (e.g.,
Kleven et al., 2018; Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018).
Many studies in the field have rather employed
dummies for different parities (e.g., Petersen
et al., 2011; Pollmann-Schult, 2011) or a single
counter for the number of children (e.g., Cooke,
2014; Gangl & Ziefle, 2009). Yet the arguments
developed in the previous sections deal, by and
large, with the transition to fatherhood and not
with the effect of specific (higher order) parities.
It is posited, for example, that employers treat
differently fathers and childless men rather than
discriminate among fathers depending on their
number of children. As for selection dynamics,
the core contrast is between men who will even-
tually become fathers and men who will not.
Differently, it could be argued that the need
for increasing work effort and for couple special-
izationmight bemore pressing after higher order
births, as additional children demand higher
income. Even if of sure interest, the effects of
different parities might not be easily disentan-
gled in the regression framework, considering
that higher order births might be endogenous to
previous births. Notably, one birth may causally
affect the chances of a subsequent birth via its
effect on a parent’s labor market standing. If
men, say, receive a wage premium after the
birth of a first child, this might increase their
chances of having a second one because they
can afford a larger family size. If, in turn, the
second birth propels men to specialize in paid
work even more and get even higher wages, part
of the effect of a first birth on wages will work
through the second birth. Focusing on the transi-
tion to fatherhood, I therefore look for the total
effect of fatherhood on wages: Such total effect
includes wage responses to higher order parities
yet avoids the empirical hurdles of disentangling
separate effects for each endogenous parity.
Models throughout also include age and
age squared to net out pure lifecycle effects.
The results are unchanged when opting for
different polynomial forms (quadratic, cubic,
and quartic) or for a full set of dummies for
age, potential labor market experience, and
(for SOEP only, due to data availability) actual
labor market experience. Period dummies are
also included, grouping years in 3-year bans
(with only two broader residual categories:
2011–2014 for SOEP, 2012–2016 for BHPS).
I grouped together multiple years consider-
ing that interviews are carried out annually in
one of the panels (SOEP). When applying the
within-individual transformation in FE models,
age and interview year thus increase of one unit
each year creating collinearity between the two
variables in the FE regression model. Grouping
period dummies circumvents this issue. For
consistency, I deploy 3-year dummies for the
U.K. arm of the analysis as well, although BHPS
interviews naturally span over multiple years.
For cross-cohort comparisons, I identify three
birth cohorts, distinguishing men born between
1950 and 1959, 1960 and 1967, and between
1968 and 1976 (1974 for Germany). Such cut-off
points ensure enough cell size in each group. I
also follow previous literature on Germany, sug-
gesting that the relationship between fatherhood
and labor market participation (and thus, per-
haps, wages) changed starting from men born
in the 1960s (Pollmann-Schult & Reynolds,
2017). For the United Kingdom, I will not report
estimates for the 1950 to 1959 British cohort
because they would be based on relatively older
men (aged 32 or older) experiencing the transi-
tion to fatherhood.
Fatherhood and Wages: Model Specifications
I start from a simple ordinary least squares
(OLS) specification of the wage equation,
yit = 𝛼 + 𝛽Childit + 𝛾1Ageit
+ 𝛾2Ageit2 + 𝜑t + 𝜀it (1)
where yit is the log of real hourly wages. Apart
from age (Ageit and Ageit
2) and period (𝜑t), no
other variables are adjusted for on the right-hand
side of the equation (e.g., Killewald & Lund-
berg, 2017; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009).
My goal here is to test whether data are compat-
ible with a causal fatherhood wage bonus. Par-
simony in model specification allows, first, to
estimate such gross bonus if any. Second, par-
simony shields estimates from the risk of over-
control bias (Elwert & Winship, 2014), that is,
of muting the effect fatherhood has on wages by
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accounting for the channels through which the
effect could manifest in the first place. Adjusting
for working hours, for example, could already
account for part of the bonus in accordance
with the work effort mechanism. I refrain from
including this and similar variables in the analy-
ses, as the question of whether data supports a
causal fatherhood wage bonus predates asking
what mediates the bonus if present.
Still, pooling together all observations as if
they belonged to different units, the OLS model
does not distinguish person-year records belong-
ing to the same person from person-year records
belonging to a different one. Estimates of 𝛽 in
Equation 1, therefore, simply contrast records in
which the transition to fatherhood has occurred
(Childit = 1) to records in which the transition
has not occurred (Childit = 0). The latter group
of observations includes both fathers-to-be prior
to first childbirth and men belonging to the con-
trol group of childless men.
Differently, to focus on within-individual
change, and thus on the transition to father-
hood, I contrast Equation 1 to the following FE
specification:
yit = 𝛽Childit + 𝛾1Ageit + 𝛾2Ageit2
+ 𝜑t + 𝜃i + 𝜀it (2)
The estimation of 𝛽 associated with Childit
in Equation 2 rests only on within-unit variance
because of the inclusion of individual FE 𝜃i. 𝛽
can now be interpreted as the average one-off
shift in wages that men experience when becom-
ing fathers (for details on how this average is
computed, see Borusyak & Jaravel, 2016; Imai
& Kim, 2017). Furthermore, individual FE curb
estimates of 𝛽 from time-invariant sources of
selection into fatherhood. The role and direc-
tion of such type of selection can be assessed
in two ways. First, I contrast OLS and FE esti-
mates of the 𝛽 coefficient in both equations. Neg-
ative selection on time-invariant individual char-
acteristics should be signaled by an increase in
the magnitude of 𝛽 in the FE model; positive
selection, vice versa, by a decrease. Second, I
look at the correlation coefficient r(𝜃i,Childit),
expressing the sign and magnitude of selec-
tion into fatherhood in terms of the correlation
between wage-relevant time-constant unobserv-
ables 𝜃i and the variable for fatherhood, Childit
(e.g., Gangl & Ziefle, 2009).
Although the model in Equation 2 nets out
time-invariant sources of selection, it still makes
a number of assumptions. One is that the change
in wage levels come fatherhood can be expressed
as a one-off change, summarized by a sin-
gle coefficient 𝛽. Research on male marital
wage premiums and motherhood wage penal-
ties alike has now well established that fam-
ily events impact wages in a dynamic fashion
(e.g., Kleven et al., 2018; Korenman & Neu-
mark, 1991; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009).
In other words, one is better off modeling par-
enthood effects year by year after the birth of
a child, as short-, medium-, and long-run shifts
in wage levels may differ. This first assumption
is relaxed by deploying an event-study design
(e.g., Kleven et al., 2018), including leads k of
Childit as follows (see also Imai & Kim, 2017):
yit =
k=10∑
k=0
𝛽k · 𝟙(k = t − Childi) + 𝛾1Ageit
+ 𝛾2Ageit2 + 𝜑t + 𝜃i + 𝜀it (3)
With Childi I now indicate the year in which
the child’s birth occurs for an individual i. Cal-
endar time keeps being signaled by the sub-
script t. 𝟙(k = ...) is the indicator function whose
argument can be either 1 or 0, that is, a (set
of) dummy variable(s). Equation 3 then includes
event-time dummies k for each year t since the
year of first childbirth and up to the 10th after.
I cap the last indicator variable (k = 10), cod-
ing 1 all years after the 10th since first child-
birth. The results from Equation 3 are unaltered
by this choice (see also Section 3 in Appendix
S1; for cell sizes in each year k, see Table 1 in
Appendix S1).
With Equation 3, I am thus able to capture
the dynamic evolution of wages after fatherhood.
Yet, prior to fatherhood, fathers to be and child-
less men could be on different wage growth
paths. This would violate another assumption
behind the FE estimator, namely, the parallel
trend assumption for a treatment (here, Childit).
Equations 2 and 3 indeed require that outcomes
evolve in parallel for controls and treated prior
to the treatment (e.g., Brüderl & Ludwig, 2015;
Wooldridge, 2010). In my case, childless men
and fathers-to-be (prior to fatherhood onset)
should experience similar wage growth. This
might not be the case considering, for example,
that much of selection into fatherhood operates
through selection into a union (e.g., Trimarchi &
Van Bavel, 2017) and men who enter a union are
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on steeper wage growth profiles compared with
men who remain single (e.g., Ludwig &Brüderl,
2018). Given that entry into a union has little
causal effect per se on men’s wages (Killewald
& Lundberg, 2017; Loughran & Zissimopoulos,
2009; Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018), there is little
risk that fatherhood wage premiums are actually
marital wage premiums. Adjusting estimates for
men’s entry into union is thus likely unnecessary
to achieve credible causal inference on father-
hood and wages (cf. Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018;
see also Figure 4 in Appendix S1). Rather, a pro-
cess of selection on the basis of wage growth
might underlie family formation (union entry
and fatherhood), and failing to account for it may
lead to incorrectly claim the existence of a posi-
tive wage boost brought about by fatherhood.
Hence, to complement the evidence obtained
via the FE estimators in Equations 2 and 3, one
can ask if any effect of fatherhood on wages can
be detected once any individual trend in wage
growth is netted out (Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018).
A more restrictive specification of this kind fully
accounts for the chance that fathers-to-be and
childless men may be on different wage-growth
paths. It could permit wage growth to depend
on any (time-invariant) individual characteris-
tic, as each man in the sample would basi-
cally have his own wage slope. A FEIS model
(e.g., Brüderl & Ludwig, 2015) is thus fitted
in several steps. First, one estimates separate
OLS regressions for each individual i, regressing
log-wages yit on a constant and a linear term for
age. Second, the predicted values for each indi-
vidual regression are subtracted from yit, thus
obtaining wage values for each individual i that
are both demeaned (constant term in Step 1)
and detrended (linear term for age in Step 1).
Third, all independent variables are similarly
demeaned and detrended. Finally, one can run an
OLS on the transformed data. All of these steps
are automated in the STATA (StataCorp, College
Station, TX) routine xtfeis (Brüderl & Ludwig,
2015), which I deploy. A more compact formu-
lation of the model is as follows (Wooldridge,
2010, p. 377):
yit = 𝛽Childit + 𝛾2Ageit2 + 𝜑t +Wit′𝜃i + 𝜀it
(4)
With respect to the FE specification in
Equation 2, I allow now for the product of
individual FE 𝜃i and some observable variable,
namely, the linear term for age contained in
the vector Wit
′
. I ran such FEIS estimation
both using the single dummy variable Childit
and, separately, the event-study approach of
Equation 3. Notably, given that FEIS estimation
is based on an OLS model for each single indi-
vidual (Step 1) including two parameters (the
constant term plus a linear slope for age), at least
three observations per person are needed, hence
the aforementioned sample restriction (Ludwig
& Brüderl, 2018). Throughout, standard errors
are handled via the Huber-White estimator to
account for the clustering of observations within
each individual (via the option robust in STATA
14.0).
Findings
Pooling data from all the available waves,
Figure 1 depicts the average wage levels from
age 20 onward and separately for men who will
eventually become fathers and for men who
will not. Trends were similar in Germany and
Britain. Wages at the mean grew at a faster
pace for fathers relative to nonfathers, already
since their late 20s and early 30s. After that,
the gap somewhat widened. Such a pattern
could be consistent with the existence of a
(modest) fatherhood wage bonus, as wage tra-
jectories diverged more markedly around the
age of first-time fatherhood in both countries
(McMunn et al., 2015; Struffolino et al., 2016).
The picture could not be conclusive, however,
on whether men experienced a wage premium
come parenthood or some antecedent factors
boosted the wages of fathers-to-be.
Turning to statistical models, OLS estimates
in the first column of Table 2 and Table 3 reflect
the patterns displayed in Figure 1. Fatherhood
was associated with an average wage gain of
about 14% in Germany (p < .001) and 17% in
Britain (p < .001). In terms of magnitude, these
estimates were compatible with those high-
lighted for the United States in previous studies
(Hodges & Budig, 2010; Lundberg & Rose,
2000). Yet OLS regression pooled all observa-
tions in the panel and did not distinguish records
belonging to the same individual from records
belonging to a different individual. As a result,
OLS estimates in the first column of both tables
simply contrast person-year records of men
once they have become fathers with person-year
records of men who are not (or not yet) fathers.
I thus quantified the differential already shown
in Figure 1, but could not address the potential
bias stemming from selection into fatherhood.
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Figure 1. Average Log Hourly Wages by Age of the Respondent, Separately for Childless Men and Fathers.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel 1984 to 2014, British Household Panel Survey 1991 to 2016.
Table 2. OLS, FE, and FEIS Models for the Log of Real Hourly Wages: German Sample (German Socio-Economic Panel
1984–2014)
1 2 3
OLS FE FEIS
First-time father (ref. childless), 𝛽 (SE) 0.142*** (0.005) 0.038*** (0.011) −0.010 (0.010)
r(𝜃i,Childit) 0.13
R2 (within-R2 in Columns 2 and 3) 0.14 0.23 0.07
Number of individuals 2,713 2,713 2,713
Number of person-years 34,925 34,925 34,925
Note: All models include period dummies and a quadratic for age. A linear term for age is allowed to vary across individuals
in the FEIS specification. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. FE= fixed effects; FEIS= fixed effects individual
slope; OLS = ordinary least squares; ref. = reference. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
A step forward in this latter direction came
from FE estimates in the second column of
Tables 2 and 3. Such estimates focused on
within-individual variation and therefore could
be interpreted as the one-off shift in wage levels
brought about, on average, by the transition to
fatherhood. Netting time-invariant differences
between men by means of individual FE, the
estimates were reduced. The shift in wages
brought about by fatherhood stopped at around
3.8% in Germany (p = .001). For British men,
similarly, the fatherhood wage premium halted
at 3% (p = .028). The decrease in size compared
with OLS estimates was opposite to what pre-
vious studies have found for the United States.
Selection into fatherhood in both Germany and
Britain seemed to be positive on average, that
is, high-earning men in both countries were
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Table 3. OLS, FE, and FEIS Models for the Log of Real Hourly Wages: British Sample (British Household Panel Survey
1991–2016)
1 2 3
OLS FE FEIS
First-time father (ref. childless), 𝛽 (SE) 0.172*** (0.008) 0.030* (0.014) 0.002 (0.013)
r(𝜃i,Childit) 0.17
R2 (within-R2 in Columns 2 and 3) 0.11 0.22 0.09
Number of individuals 1,253 1,253 1,253
Number of person-years 15,470 15,470 15,470
Note: All models include period dummies and a quadratic for age. A linear term for age is allowed to vary across individuals
in the FEIS specification. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. FE= fixed effects; FEIS= fixed effects individual
slope; OLS = ordinary least squares; ref. = reference. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
more likely to become fathers. At the bottom
of both tables, correlations r(𝜃i,Childit) further
supported this conclusion. For both countries, I
found small and positive correlations between
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 𝜃i and
my indicator variable for fatherhood. Unob-
served, time-invariant factors relevant for wage
determination were thus positively correlated
with the transition to fatherhood.
Even if netting out time-invariant heterogene-
ity between individuals substantially reduced the
bonus, FE estimates could still be biased if the
wages of men who eventually become fathers
grew at a faster pace than those of their child-
less counterparts. In the third column of Tables 2
and 3, FEIS estimates addressed this by let-
ting the wage-age profile vary between men.
Now, including individual slopes, I could not
reject the hypothesis that the effect fatherhood
had on wages was actually nil for German men
(𝛽 = −.010, p = .301). The same could be said
for British men looking at FEIS estimates in
Table 3 (𝛽 = .002, p = .845). Hence, once the
possibility of divergent individual wage trajecto-
ries was accounted for, the evidence did not sup-
port a causal story for the fatherhoodwage bonus
(as for U.S. men in Ludwig & Brüderl, 2018).
So far, I have assumed that fatherhood may
bring about a one-off shift in men’s wage levels.
Such an assumption could be unwarranted. For
example, men could increase their work effort
or specialize in paid work particularly in the
first years following a child’s birth, often com-
pensating for mothers’ work interruptions and
subsequent income loss during that period. As
many applied and methodological contributions
have shown (e.g., Borusyak & Jaravel, 2016;
Korenman & Neumark, 1991), a simple dummy
for “before-after” the event of childbirth will
not help retrieving more complex, dynamic
effects. Figure 2 thus displays estimates from
an event-study approach in which the wage
response to fatherhood was singled out for
each year after that of a child’s birth—as per
Equation 3. For German men, the figure sup-
ports the presence of a fatherhood wage bonus,
especially in the short term. FE estimates in the
first 5 years were all positive and around the
size previously assessed with the single-dummy
approach (≈4%). For British men, point esti-
mates were in a similar range, being compatible
with wage bonuses of around 2% to 4% points
in the aftermath of fatherhood.
Yet, turning to FEIS estimates and thus
accounting for idiosyncratic wage growth, the
alleged premium reduced further. For Ger-
many, in particular, estimates turned negative
already in years 0 (p = .373), 1 (p = .049), and 2
(p = .016). In later years, the estimates were not
just negative in sign but substantial in size. Yet,
as the number of fathers observed in such later
years shrunk, the precision of FEIS estimates in
the long run became questionable with respect
to both the sign of the point estimates and to the
width of confidence intervals (see also Ludwig
& Brüderl, 2018; Section 3 of Appendix S1 for
sensitivity checks). It was therefore unwarranted
to consider such estimates as evidence of some
substantial long-run fatherhood wage penalty in
Germany.
FEIS estimates for the United Kingdom were
close to 0 in the first years after childbirth and
quite noisy thereafter. For the aforementioned
sensitivity of such long-run estimates, caution
should be applied this time to the idea that
fatherhood spurred substantial wage premiums
for British fathers in the long run.
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Figure 2. Point Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for the Event Study of Fatherhood and Wages.
Note: Fixed effects (FE) estimates and fixed effects individual-slope (FEIS) estimates on display.
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel 1984 to 2014, British Household Panel Survey 1991 to 2016.
Hence, even if the wage trajectories of fathers
and nonfathers depicted in Figure 2 differed
markedly in both countries, there was no strong
evidence to conclude that fatherhood boosted
men’s wages in Germany and the United King-
dom. Rather, the apparent wage premium could
be traced back, by and large, to positive selec-
tion both on the basis of wage levels (static) and
on the basis of wage growth (dynamic). Already
prior to their child’s birth, that is, fathers to
be earned relatively higher wages and were on
superior wage growth paths than their childless
counterparts.
Heterogeneous Effects? A Comparison Across
Cohorts
On balance, the evidence presented in the pre-
vious section could not support the idea of a
causal fatherhood wage premium. Regardless of
the estimation method though, all of my anal-
yses tested for the presence of a premium for
all men on average. In the remainder, I exam-
ine cohort differences: Fatherhood wage premi-
ums might simply be a thing of the past, as
the United Kingdom and Germany shifted away
from a traditional male-breadwinner model in
recent decades.
In Figure 3, I repeat the analyses for Ger-
many separately by birth cohort. OLS estimates
suggested that fatherhood was associated
with higher wages for men, especially for those
belonging to the older cohorts (up to around 23%
for the 1950–1959 cohort). After the inclusion
of individual FE, estimates were substantially
reduced for the older cohorts, and they remained
small but stationary for the youngest. Finally,
looking at the FEIS specification, estimates
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Figure 3. Point Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for the Coefficient of First-Time Fatherhood on Log
Wages.
Note: Separate models for different birth cohorts. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 1984 to 2014. FE = fixed effects;
FEIS = fixed effects individual slope; OLS = ordinary least squares.
further reduced and were no longer compatible
with the idea of a wage premium particularly in
the youngest cohorts (for the 1950–1959 cohort,
somewhat differently, 𝛽Childit = .02, p = .350).
The results for Britain in Figure 4 exhibited
similar patterns across model specifications. In
the FEIS specification, in particular, fatherhood
brought about a wage gain of around 2% for
the 1960 to 1967 cohort (p = .266), whereas the
point estimate for the youngest cohort was even
negative (−.004, p = .811).
Given the partitioning of the sample in differ-
ent cohorts, I refrain from presenting here the
event-study part of my analyses for each sepa-
rate group due to the small cell size. Nonethe-
less, event-study results (see Figures 5 and 6 in
Appendix S1), with both FE and FEIS specifica-
tions, gave no strong indication of a fatherhood
bonus across cohorts in the United Kingdom and
Germany.
At best, small causal fatherhood premiums
are indeed a thing of the past in Germany and
theUnitedKingdom.Notably, cross-cohort anal-
yses also revealed that selection into fatherhood
on the basis of wage-relevant, time-invariant
characteristics might have become less posi-
tive across subsequent cohorts. This was evi-
denced by the smaller and smaller contribution
that including individual FE made to estimates
of the premium across cohorts in Figures 3
and 4.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this study, I ask whether men get a wage
premium when they become fathers in coun-
tries that have long supported male breadwin-
ning. I propose that observed premiums could be
a statistical artifact if men who become fathers
have a higher earning potential and experience
steeper wage growth than men that will even-
tually remain childless. By deploying several
model specifications that variously account for
such selection dynamics, I cannot reject the null
of no effect of fatherhood on men’s wages. What
is more, across cohorts, both the size of premi-
ums and the importance of selection into father-
hood appear to be fading in Germany and the
United Kingdom. Over time, fatherhood may
have thus become less of a marker of bread-
winning in the labor market, and traits associ-
ated with breadwinning may have become less
important for the transition to fatherhood in the
marriage market.
Such findings stand in contrast with previ-
ous studies in a twofold sense. First, pertain-
ing to selection into fatherhood, I find that
British and German men positively select into
parenthood on the basis of time-invariant unob-
served factors. In the United States, such selec-
tion dynamic appears to be negative instead
(Hodges & Budig, 2010; Killewald & Gough,
2013; Lundberg & Rose, 2000). The portion of
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Figure 4. Point Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for the Coefficient of First-Time Fatherhood on Log
Wages.
Note: Separate models for different birth cohorts. Source: British Household Panel Survey 1991 to 2016. FE = fixed effects;
FEIS = fixed effects individual slope; OLS = ordinary least squares.
the premium due to positive selection also has
been decreasing across cohorts in both Germany
and the United Kingdom. This differs from find-
ings from cross-cohort analyses carried out in
Nordic countries, typically finding persistent or
even increasing positive selection of men into
parenthood on the basis of wage levels or on
antecedents of earning power such as educa-
tional attainment (Hart, 2015; Jalovaara et al.,
2018; Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008). As the ques-
tion of which men become fathers has broad
implications—not limited to men’s own wage
attainment, but extending to income inequality
across households or the intergenerational trans-
mission of (dis)advantage (e.g., Huerta et al.,
2014; McCall & Percheski, 2010)—this study
motivates research on the demography of father-
hood and whether and how it is changing over
time (see, e.g., Autor, Dom, & Hanson, 2017;
Kearney & Wilson, 2018).
Second, differently from the U.S.-based
literature, considering selection on both
time-invariant unobserved factors and on prior
wage growth, I cannot conclude that fatherhood
sparks the wage attainment of men in the United
Kingdom and Germany. As a consequence,
highlighting the crucial role played by selec-
tion dynamics casts doubts on the credibility
of estimates of fatherhood premiums derived
by cross-sectional data, lest they will account
for selection into fatherhood as well. So far
largely confined to the role of unobservables,
results in this study prompt further research on
those features (personality, genes, noncognitive
skills, beauty, etc.; see, e.g., Bowles, Gintis, &
Osborne, 2001) that may matter for both wage
attainment and the transition to fatherhood to be
considered in a comparative and cross-cohort
perspective.
Surely, the inability to reject the null in this
study could reflect the fact that fatherhood
indeed has a negligible (causal) effect on men’s
wages, but it may also stem from (a) lack of
statistical power, (b) measurement error, and (c)
deficiencies in the study design. Sample sizes in
this study are highly comparable to previous lon-
gitudinal studies on fatherhood and wages (e.g.,
Killewald & Gough, 2013; Smith Koslowski,
2011). Yet, if true effects are small or very small
I may have failed to detect them due to a lack
of statistical power. Across both my main and
subgroup analyses, at best fatherhood premi-
ums amounted to 3% to 4%. If even smaller
premiums exist and could not be detected here,
however, it is worthwhile to question what their
substantial significance would be, especially
when contrasted, on the other hand, with the
order of magnitude of motherhood wage penal-
ties (e.g., Cools et al., 2017; Gangl & Ziefle,
2009; Harkness, 2016; Kleven et al., 2018).
Findings in this article may also be inval-
idated by measurement errors. Measurement
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error could affect the computation of log hourly
wages as well as the construction of the key
independent variable operationalizing the tran-
sition to fatherhood. For the former, I relied on
well-established practices in the literature (e.g.,
Bryan & Sevilla-Sanz, 2011; Gangl & Ziefle,
2009; Kühhirt & Ludwig, 2012), and I can only
note that my conclusions on fatherhood and
wages are consistent with those of studies using
perhaps more precise register data, albeit for
different countries (Cools et al., 2017; Kleven
et al., 2018). Furthermore, using fertility history
files has enabled me to detect the precise timing
of the transition to fatherhood, a crucial require-
ment for the event-study part of the analyses
presented here.
Finally, even if the study design of this article
has sought to curb estimates of the fatherhood
bonus from multiple sources of selection bias,
evidence from alternative causal designs could
complement my findings. Examples of alterna-
tive designs could include quasi-experimental
studies matching childless men and fathers
on time-constant and, especially, time-varying
confounders (e.g., for the male marital wage
premium, Mincy, Hill, & Sinkewicz, 2009) or
approaches based on instrumenting the tran-
sition to parenthood (e.g., Cools et al., 2017;
Kleven et al., 2018). Experimental studies, so
far failing to detect a preference for fathers in
terms of hiring chances in field settings (Bygren
et al., 2017; Correll et al., 2007), could also
complement the evidence of this study by inves-
tigating employers’ wage offers to prospective
male employees, depending on parental status.
In addition, this study has only focused on
the transition to fatherhood and possible het-
erogeneities by cohort. Future research could
deploy the same stringent tests to assess how
men’s wages respond to higher order parities
and across other social groupings. Parity- and
group-specific mechanisms should of course
motivate these analyses.
All in all, the evidence amassed in this study
cannot support the idea of a causal wage pre-
mium for fathers in Germany and the United
Kingdom. One consequence is that as much as
gender wage gaps in the two countries are driven
by the transition to parenthood, the penalty for
mothers rather than the premium for fathers
really drives the gap in labor markets. The wage
response to motherhood, however, has yet to be
put to test using FEIS, accounting thereby for
heterogeneous individual wage growth (but see
Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009; Livermore,
Rodgers, & Siminski, 2011). If, on average,
mothers-to-be are on worse (better) wage growth
paths than womenwhowill not becomemothers,
motherhood penalties could have actually been
overestimated (underestimated) in the literature
so far. This study motivates future research into
the reciprocal relationship between wages and
motherhood, too.
Absent wage boosts for fathers, nonethe-
less, it appears wage losses for mothers will
not be compensated for within the confines of
households alone. Evidence on men’s wages in
this article thus indirectly calls for continued
research on those policies that may mitigate the
motherhood wage penalty and reduce gender
economic inequalities more at large. Notably,
my findings for Germany and the United
Kingdom are consistent with those of similar
event-study designs for Scandinavian countries
(for Denmark, Kleven et al., 2018; for Norway,
Cools et al., 2017), countries that have a much
longer tradition of support for men’s role as
carers and women’s role as earners. As increas-
ingly inclusive care policies are implemented in
former male-breadwinner societies, especially
in the form of parental leaves, future research
could evaluate their impact on men’s labor
market outcomes (e.g., for Scandinavia, Rege
& Solli, 2013; Albrecht et al., 2015; Evertsson
et al., 2016). The evidence in this study can-
not support a causal story linking wages and
fatherhood per se, after all.
Note
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